Family Members of Husband should not be implicated in Dowry case merely on "FIR"
Important Leading Case:
SUPREME
COURT OF INDIA
(T.S.
THAKUR & GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.)
GEETA
MEHROTRA & ANR. ------Appellants
VERSUS
STATE
OF U.P. & ANR. -----Respondents
Criminal
Appeal No. 1674 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10547/2010)-Decided
on 17-10-2012.
Quashing
of FIR – Dowry / Cruelty – Quashed
JUDGMENT
Gyan
Sudha Misra, J.-This
appeal by special leave in which we granted leave has been filed by the
appellants against the order dated 6.9.2010 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Crl. Miscellaneous Application No.22714/2007 whereby
the High Court had been pleased to dispose of the application moved by the
appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order of the Magistrate
taking cognizance against the appellants under Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC
read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act with an observation that the
question of territorial jurisdiction cannot be properly decided by the High
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for want of adequate facts. It was, therefore, left
open to the appellants to move the trial court for dropping the proceedings on
the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court however granted
interim protection to the appellants by directing the authorities not to issue
coercive process against the appellants until disposal of the application filed
by the appellants with a further direction to the trial court to dispose of the
application if moved by the appellants, within a period of two months from the
date of moving the application. The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was
thus disposed of by the High Court.
2.
The appellants in spite of the liberty granted to them to move the trial court,
have filed this appeal for quashing the proceedings which had been initiated on
the basis of a case lodged by the respondent
No.2 Smt. Shipra Mehrotra (earlier known as Shipra Seth) against her husband, father-in-law,
mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law. This appeal has been preferred
by the
sister-in- law, who is appellant No.1 and brother-in-law of the complainant,
who is appellant No.2.
3.
The case emerges out of the first information report lodged by respondent No.2
Smt. Shipra Mehrotra under Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC read with Section 3/4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act
bearing F.I.R.No. 52/2004. The F.I.R. was registered at Mahila Thana Daraganj,
Allahabad wherein the complainant alleged that she was married to Shyamji
Mehrotra s/o Balbir Saran who was living at Eros Garden, Charmswood Village,
Faridabad, Suraj Kund Road at Faridabad Haryana as per the Hindu marriage rites
and customs. Prior to marriage the complainant and her family members were told
by Shyamji Mehrotra and his elder brother Ramji Mehrotra who is appellant No.2
herein and their mother Smt. Kamla Mehrotra and her sister Geeta Mehrotra who is
appellant No.1 herein that Shyamji is employed as a Team Leader in a top I.T.
Company in Chennai and is getting salary of Rs.45,000/- per month. After
negotiation between the parents of the
complainant and the accused parties, the marriage of the complainant Shipra
Seth (later Shipra Mehrotra) and Shyamji Mehrotra was performed after which the
respondent-complainant left for the house of her in- laws.
4.
It was stated that the atmosphere in the house was peaceful for sometime but
soon after the wedding, when all the relatives left, the maid who cooked meals
was first of all paid-off by the aforesaid four persons who then told the
complainant that from now onwards, the complainant will have to prepare food
for the family. In addition, the above mentioned people started taunting and
scolding her on trivial issues. The complainant also came to know that Shyamji
was not employed anywhere and always stayed in the house. Shyamji gradually
took away all the money which the complainant had with her and then told her
that her father had not given dowry properly, therefore, she should get Rupees
five lakhs from her father in order to enable him to start business, because he
was not getting any job. When the complainant clearly declined and stated that
she will not ask her parents for money, Shyamji, on instigation of other
accused-family members, started beating her occasionally. To escape every day
torture and financial status of the family, the complainant took up a job in a
Call Centre at Convergys on 17.2.2003 where the complainant had to do night
shifts due to which she used to come back home at around 3 a.m. in the morning.
Just on her return from work, the household people started playing bhajan
cassettes after which she had to getup at 7’o clock in the morning to prepare
and serve food to all the members in the family. Often on falling asleep in the
morning, Shyamji, Kamla Devi and Geeta Mehrotra tortured the complainant every
day mentally and physically. Ramji Mehrotra often provoked the other three
family members to torture and often used to make the complainant feel sad by
making inappropriate statements about the complainant and her parents. Her
husband Shyamji also took away the salary from the complainant.
5.
After persistent efforts, Shyamji finally got a job in Chennai and he went to
Chennai for the job in May, 2003. But, it is alleged that there was no change
in his behaviour even after going to Chennai. The complainant often called him
on phone to talk to him but he always did irrelevant conversation. He never
spoke properly with the complainant whenever he visited home and often used to
hurl filthy abuses. The complainant states that she often wept and tolerated
the tortures of the accused persons for a long time but did not complain to her
family members, as that would have made them feel sad. At last, when the
complainant realized that even her life was in danger, she was compelled to
tell everything to her father on phone who was very upset on hearing her woes.
On 15.7.2003 complainant heard some conversation of her mother-in-law and
sister-in-law from
which it appeared to her that they want to kill the complainant in the night
only. Thereupon the complainant apprised her father of the situation on phone
to which her father replied that he will call back her father-in-law and she
should go with him immediately and he will come in the morning. The
father-in-law Satish Dhawan and his wife who were living in NOIDA thereafter came
in the night and somehow took the complainant to their home who also came to
know of everything. The complainant’s father and brother later went to her
matrimonial home on16.7.2003. On seeing her father and brother, Kamla Mehrotra
and Geeta Mehrotra started speaking loudly and started saying that Shyamji
would be coming by the evening and so he should come in the evening for talking
to them. Her father and brother then went away from there. That very day, her
husband Shyamji and brother-in-law Ramji also reached home. On reaching there,
Shyamji abused her on phone and told her to send her father.
6.
When father and brother of the complainant went home in the evening, they were
also insulted by all the four and video camera and tape were played and in the
end they were told that they should leave from here. Insulted, they came back
from there and then came back to Allahabad with the complainant. For many days
the complainant and her family members hoped that the situation would improve
if the matter was resolved. Many times other people tried to persuade the in –
laws but to no avail. Her brother went to their house to talk to her in – laws
but it came to his knowledge that the in – laws had changed their house. After
much effort, they came to know that the father-in- law and mother-in-law
started living at B-39, Brahma cooperative group housing society, block 7,
sector-7, Dwarka, Delhi. On 19.09.04 evening, her father talked to Kamla Mehrotra
and Geeta Mehrotra regarding the complainant using bad words and it was said
that if her daughter came there she will be kicked out. After some time Shyamji
rang up at complainant’s home but on hearing the complainant’s voice, he told
her abusively that now she should not come his way and she should tell her
father not to phone him in future. At approximately 10:30 pm in the night
Ramji’s phone came to the complainant’s home. He used bad words while talking
to her father and in the end said that he had got papers prepared in his defence
and he may do whatever he could but if he could afford to give Rs.10 lakhs then
it should be conveyed after which he will reconsider the matter. If the girl
was sent to his place without money, then even her dead body will not be found.
7.
On hearing these talks of the accused, the complainant believed that her
in-laws will not let the complainant
enter their home without taking ten lakhs and if the complainant went there on
her own, she will not be safe. Hence, she lodged the report wherein she prayed
that the SHO Daraganj should be ordered to do the needful after registering the
case against the accused Shyam Mehrotra, Ramji Mehrotra, Kamla Mehrotra and
Geeta Mehrotra. Thus, in substance, the complainant
related the bickering at her matrimonial home which made her life miserable inseveral
ways and compelled her to leave her in- law’s place in order to live with her
father where she lodged a police case as stated herein before.
8.
On the basis of the complaint, the investigating authorities at P.S. Daraganj,
Allahabad started investigation of the case and thereafter the police submitted
chargesheet against the appellants and other family members of the
complainant’s husband.
9.
Hence, the appellants who are sister and brother of the complainant’s husband
filed petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the chargesheet and
the entire proceedings pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate,
Court No.IV, Allahabad, inter- alia, on the ground that FIR has been lodged
with mala fide intentions to harass the appellants and that no case was made out
against the appellants as well as other family members. But the principal
ground of challenge to the FIR was that the incident although was alleged to
have taken place at Faridabad and the investigation should have been done there
only, the complainant with mala fide intention in connivance with the father of
the complainant, got the investigating officer to record the statements by
visiting Ghaziabad which was beyond his territorial jurisdiction and cannot be construed
as legal and proper investigation. It was also alleged that the father of the
complainant got the arrest warrant issued through George Town Police Station,
Allahabad, in spite of the cause of action having arisen at Allahabad.
10.
This appeal has been preferred by Kumari Geeta Mehrotra i.e. the sister of the
complainant’s husband
and Ramji Mehrotra i.e. the elder brother of the complainant’s husband
assailing the order of the High Court and it was submitted that the Hon’ble
High Court ought to have appreciated that the complainant who had already
obtained an ex-parte decree of divorce, is pursuing the present case through
her father with the sole purpose to unnecessarily harass the appellants to
extract money from them as all efforts of mediation had failed.
11.
However, the grounds of challenge before this Court to the order of the High
Court, inter alia is that the High Court had failed to appreciate that the
investigation had been done by the authority without following due process of
law which also lacked territorial jurisdiction. The relevant documents/parcha
diary for deciding the territorial jurisdiction had been overlooked as the FIR
has been lodged at Allahabad although the cause of action of the entire
incident is alleged to have taken place at Faridabad (Haryana). It was,
therefore, submitted that the investigating authorities of the Allahabad have
traversed beyond the territorial limits which is clearly an abuse of the
process of law and the High Court has failed to exercise its inherent powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the facts and circumstances of this case and
allowed the proceedings to go on before the trial court although it had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
12.
It was further averred that the High Court had failed to examine the facts of
the FIR to see whether the facts stated in the FIR constitute any prima facie
case making out an offence against the sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the
complainant and whether there was at all any material to constitute an offence
against the appellants and their family members. Attention of this Court was
further invited to the contradictions in the statement of the complainant and
her father which indicate material contradictions indicating that the
complainant and her father have concocted the story to implicate the appellants
as well as all their family members in a criminal case merely with a mala fide
intention to settle her scores and extract money from the family of her ex-husband
Shyamji Mehrotra and his family members.
13.
On a perusal of the complaint and other materials on record as also analysis of
the arguments advanced by the contesting parties in the light of the settled
principles of law reflected in a catena of decisions, it is apparent that the
High Court has not applied its mind on the question as to whether the case was
fit to be quashed against the appellants and has merely disposed of the petition
granting liberty to the appellants to move the trial court and raise
contentions on the ground as to whether it has territorial jurisdiction to
continue with the trial in the light of the averment that no part of the cause
of action had arisen at Allahabad and the entire incident even as per the FIR
had taken place at Faridabad.
14.
The High Court further overlooked the fact that during the pendency of this
case, the complainant-respondent No.2 has obtained an ex-parte decree of
divorce against her husband Shyamji Mehrotra and the High Court failed to apply
its mind whether any case could be held to have been made out against Kumari
Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra, who are the unmarried sister and elder
brother of the complainant’s ex-husband. Facts of the FIR even as it stands indicate
that although a prima facie case against the husband Shyamji Mehrotra and some
other accused persons may or may not be constituted, it surely appears to be a
case where no ingredients making out a case against the unmarried sister of the
accused Shyamji Mehrotra and his brother Ramji Mehrotra appear to be existing
for even when the complainant came to her inlaw’s house after her wedding, she
has alleged physical and mental torture by stating in general that she had been
ordered to do household activities of cooking meals for the whole family. But there
appears to be no specific allegation against the sister and brother of the
complainant’s husband as to how they could be implicated into the mutual
bickering between the complainant and her husband Shyamji Mehrotra including
his parents.
15.
Under the facts and circumstance of similar nature in the case of Ramesh vs.
State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2005) SCC (Crl.) 735 at 738 allegations
were made in a complaint against the husband, the in-laws, husband’s brother
and sister who were all the petitioners before the High Court wherein after
registration of the F.I.R. and investigation, the charge sheet was filed by the
Inspector of Police in the court of Judicial Magistrate III, Trichy. Thereupon,
the learned magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued warrants
against the appellants on 13.2.2002. Four of the accused-appellants were
arrested and released on bail by the magistrate at Mumbai. The appellants had
filed petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. before the Madras High Court for
quashing the proceedings in complaint case on the file of the Judicial
Magistrate III, Trichy. The High Court by the impugned order dismissed the
petition observing that the grounds raised by the petitioners were all subject
matters to be heard by the trial court for better appreciation after conducting
full trial as the High Court was of the view that it was only desirable to
dismiss the criminal original petition and the same was also dismissed.
However, theHigh Court had directed the Magistrate to dispense with the
personal attendance of the appellants.
16.
Aggrieved by the order of the Madras High Court dismissing the petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., the special leave petition was filed in this Court giving
rise to the appeals therein where threefold contentions were raised viz., (i)
that the allegations are frivolous and without any basis; (ii) even according
to the FIR, no incriminating acts were done within the jurisdiction of Trichy Police
Station and the court at Trichy and, therefore, the learned magistrate lacked
territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and (iii) taking
cognizance of the alleged offence at that
stage was barred under Section 468(1) Cr.P.C. as it was beyond the period of
limitation prescribed under Section 468(2) Cr.P.C. Apart from the subsequent
two contentions, it was urged that
the allegations under the FIR do not make out any offence of which cognizance
could be taken.
17.
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this matter had been pleased to hold
that the bald allegations made against the sister in law by the complainant
appeared to suggest the anxiety of the informant to rope in as many of the
husband’s relatives as possible. It was held that neither the FIR nor the
charge sheet furnished the legal basis for the magistrate to take cognizance of
the offences alleged against the appellants. The learned Judges were pleased to
hold that looking to the allegations in the FIR and the contents of the charge
sheet, none of the alleged offences under Section 498 A, 406 and Section 4 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act were made against the married sister of the
complainant’s husband who was undisputedly not living with the family of the complainant’s
husband. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold that the
High Court ought not to have relegated the sister in law to the ordeal of
trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellants were quashed and the
appeal was allowed.
18.
In so far as the plea of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, it is no doubt
true that the High Court was correct to the extent that the question of
territorial jurisdiction could be decided by the trial court itself. But this
ground was just one of the grounds to quash the proceedings initiated against
the appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. wherein it was also alleged that no
prima facie case was made out against the appellants for initiating the proceedings
under the Dowry Prohibition Act and other provisions of the IPC. The High Court
has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in so far as the consideration of the
case of the appellants are concerned, who are only brother and sister of the
complainant’s husband and are not alleged even by the complainant to have
demanded dowry from her. The High Court, therefore, ought to have considered
that even if the trial court at Allahabad had the jurisdiction to hold the
trial, the question still remained as to whether the trial against the brother
and sister of the husband was fit to be continued and whether that would amount
to abuse of the process of the court.
19.
Coming to the facts of this case, when the contents of the FIR is perused, it
is apparent that there are no allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and
Ramji Mehrotra except casual reference of their names who have been included in
the FIR but mere casual reference of the names of the family members in a
matrimonial dispute without allegation of active involvement in the matter
would not justify taking cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out
of experience that there is a tendency to involve the entire family members of
the household in the domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute
specially if it happens soon after the wedding.
20.
It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this
Court recorded in the matter of G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors.
reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this
Court had held that the High Court should have quashed the complaint arising
out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the
matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed
therein with which we entirely agree that:
“there has been an outburst of
matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacredceremony, main purpose
of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live
peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume
serious proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of the family
are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and
brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as
accused in the criminal case. There are many reasons which need not be
mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties
may ponder over their defaults and terminate the disputes amicably by mutual agreement
instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to
conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing
their cases in different courts.”
The
view taken by the judges in this matter was that the courts would not encourage
such disputes.
21.
In yet another case reported in AIR 2003 SC 1386 in the matter of B.S. Joshi
& Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Anr. it was observed that there is no
doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XXA containing Section 498A in the
Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by
relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punish the husband
and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her relatives to
satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. But if the proceedings are initiated by the
wife under Section 498A against the husband and his relatives and subsequently
she has settled her disputes with her husband and his relatives and the wife
and husband agreed for mutual divorce, refusal to exercise inherent powers by
the High Court would not be proper as it would prevent woman from settling
earlier. Thus for the purpose of securing the ends of justice quashing of FIR
becomes necessary, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of
power of quashing. It would however be a different matter depending upon the
facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not to exercise
such a power.
22.
In the instant matter, when the complainant and her husband are divorced as the
complainant wife secured an ex-parte decree of divorce, the same could have
weighed with the High Court to consider
whether proceeding initiated prior to the divorce decree was fit to be pursued
in spite of absence
of specific allegations at least against the brother and sister of the
complainant’s husband and whether continuing with this proceeding could not
have amounted to abuse of the process of the court. The High Court, however,
seems not to have examined these aspects carefully and have thus side- tracked
all these considerations merely on the ground that the territorial jurisdiction
could be raised only before the magistrate conducting the trial.
23.
In the instant case, the question of territorial jurisdiction was just one of
the grounds for quashing the proceedings along with the other grounds and,
therefore, the High Court should have examined whether the prosecution case was
fit to be quashed on other grounds or not. At this stage, the question also
crops up whether the matter is fit to be remanded to the High Court to consider
all these aspects. But in matters arising out of a criminal case, fresh
consideration by remanding the same would further result into a protracted and
vexatious proceeding which is unwarranted as was held by this Court in the case
of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) that such a course of remand would be
unnecessary and inexpedient as there was no need to prolong the controversy.
The facts in this matter on this aspect was although somewhat different since
the complainant
had lodged the complaint after seven years of delay, yet in the instant matter
the factual position remains that the complaint as it stands lacks ingredients
constituting the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition
Act against the appellants who are sister and brother of the complainant’s
husband and their involvement in the whole incident appears only by way of a
casual inclusion of their names. Hence, it cannot be overlooked that it would
be total
abuse of the process of law if we were to remand the matter to the High Court
to consider whether there were still any material to hold that the trial should
proceed against them in spite of absence of prima facie material constituting
the offence alleged against them.
24.
However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be
misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegation of overt act
indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a
given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by
highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific
allegation against accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter
arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and
judicial process to mechanically send
the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses
specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognisance of the
offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie
not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the
complainant-wife. It is the well settled principle laid down in cases too
numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an
offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing
the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to
adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of
matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence
by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a
case of overimplication by involving the entire family of the accused at the
instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the
teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her
new matrimonial surrounding.
25.
In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal
accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings
against them, inter-alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as
also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections
498A,/323/504/506 including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was
the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie
material against the appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the
trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems
to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on
the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the
appellants to approach the trial court.
26.
The High Court in our considered opinion appear to have missed that assuming
the trial court had
territorial jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit
case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima
facie case against them regarding the allegation
of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry
from the complainant.
Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as
already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court
to consider whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed
against them. But as the contents of the FIR does not disclose specific
allegation against the brother and sister of the complainant’s husband except casual
reference of their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through
protracted procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over
again by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and
his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them
specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections
498A/323/504/506, IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
27.
We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings
initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR
does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any
offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation
that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of the complainant-respondent
No.2 without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as
to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as
brother and sister of the complainant’s husband, we are pleased to quash and
set aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these appellants are concerned
and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The
appeal accordingly is allowed.
........................................................................................................................................................
2. Leading Case: Quashing Complaint
SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
(DALVEER BHANDARI & K.S.
RADHAKRISHNAN, JJ.)
PREETI
GUPTA & ANOTHER ---appellants
VERSUS
STATE
OF JHARKHAND & ANOTHER --Respondents
JT 2010 (8) SC 410 = (2010) 7 SCC
667 = 2010 AIR(SCW) 4975 = 2010(8) SCALE 131 = AIR 2010 SC 3363 = 2010 CRI.
L.J. 4303 = (2010) 9 SCR 1168
Criminal Appeal No. 1512 of 2010 (Arising
out of SLP (Crl.) No.4684 of 2009)-Decided on 13-08-2010.
Quashing
of Complaint – Dowery/Cruelty - Quashed
JUDGMENT
Dalveer
Bhandari, J.-Leave granted.
2.
This appeal has been filed by Preeti Gupta the married sister-in-law and a
permanent resident of Navasari, Surat, Gujarat with her husband and Gaurav
Poddar, a permanent resident of Goregaon, Maharashtra, who is the unmarried
brother-in-law of the complainant, Manisha Poddar, against the impugned
judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, Jharkhand dated 27.4.2009
passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos.304 of 2009.
3.
Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as
under: The Complainant Manisha was married to Kamal Poddar at Kanpur on
10.12.2006. Immediately after the marriage, the complainant who is respondent
no.2 in this appeal left for Mumbai along with her husband Kamal Poddar who was
working with the Tata Consultancy Services (for short "TCS") and was
permanently residing at Mumbai. The complainant also joined the TCS at Mumbai
on 23.12.2006. Respondent no.2 visited Ranchi to participate in
"Gangaur" festival (an important Hindu festival widely celebrated in
Northern India) on 16.3.2007. After staying there for a week, she returned to
Mumbai on 24.03.2007.
4.
Respondent no.2, Manisha Poddar filed a complaint on 08.07.2007 before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi under sections 498-A, 406, 341, 323 and 120-B
of the Indian Penal Code read with sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act against all immediate relations of her husband, namely, Pyarelal Poddar
(father-in-law), Kamal Poddar (husband), Sushila Devi (mother-in-law), Gaurav
Poddar (unmarried brother-in-law) and Preeti Gupta @ Preeti Agrawal (married
sister-in-law). The complaint was transferred to the court of the Judicial
Magistrate, Ranchi. Statements of Respondent no.2 and other witnesses were
recorded and on 10.10.2008 the Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and passed
the summoning order of the appellants. The appellants are aggrieved by the said
summoning order.
5.
In the criminal complaint, it was alleged that a luxury car was demanded by
all the accused named in the complaint. It was also alleged that respondent
no.2 was physically assaulted at Mumbai. According to the said allegations of
the complainant, it appears that the alleged incidents had taken place either
at Kanpur or Mumbai. According to the averments of the complaint, except for
the demand of the luxury car no incident of harassment took place at Ranchi.
6.
According to the appellants, there was no specific allegation against both the
appellants in the complaint. Appellant no.1 had been permanently residing with
her husband at Navasari, Surat (Gujarat) for the last more than seven years.
She had never visited Mumbai during the year 2007 and never stayed with
respondent no.2 or her husband. Similarly, appellant no.2, unmarried
brother-in-law of the complainant has also been permanently residing at
Goregaon, Maharashtra.
7.
It was asserted that there is no specific allegation in the entire complaint
against both the appellants. The statements of prosecution witnesses PW1 to PW4
were also recorded along with the statement of the complainant. None of the
prosecution witnesses had stated anything against the appellants. These
appellants had very clearly stated in this appeal that they had never visited
Ranchi. The appellants also stated that they had never interfered with the internal
affairs of the complainant and her husband. According to them, there was no
question of any interference because the appellants had been living in
different cities for a number of years.
8.
It was clearly alleged by the appellants that they had been falsely implicated
in this case. It was further stated that the complaint against the appellants
was totally without any basis or foundation. The appellants also asserted that
even if all the allegations incorporated in the complaint were taken to be true,
even then no offence could be made out against them.
9.
The appellants had submitted that the High Court ought to have quashed this
complaint as far as both the appellants are concerned because there were no
specific allegations against the appellants and they ought not have been
summoned. In the impugned judgment, while declining to exercise its inherent
powers, the High Court observed as under:
"In
this context, I may again reiterate that the acts relating to demand or
subjecting to cruelty, as per the complaint petition, have been committed at
the place where the complainant was living with her husband. However, the
complainant in her statement made under solemn affirmation has stated that when
she came to Ranchi on the occasion of Holi, all the accused persons came and
passed sarcastic remarks which in absence of actual wordings, according to the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner could never be presumed to be an
act constituting offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code."
10.
In this appeal, both the appellants specifically asserted that they had never
visited Ranchi, therefore, the allegations that they made any sarcastic remarks
to the complainant had no basis or foundation as far as the appellants are
concerned.
11.
The complainant could not dispute that appellant no.1 was a permanent resident
living with her husband at Navasari, Surat, Gujarat for the last more than
seven years and the appellant no.2 was permanent resident of Goregaon,
Maharashtra. They had never spent any time with respondent no.2.
12.
According to the appellants, they are not the residents of Ranchi and if they
are compelled to attend the Ranchi Court repeatedly then that would lead to
insurmountable harassment and inconvenience to the appellants as well as to the
complainant.
13. The complaint in this case under section 498-A IPC has
led to several other cases. It is mentioned that a divorce petition has been
filed by the husband of respondent no.2. Both respondent no.2 and her husband
are highly qualified and are working with reputed organization like Tata
Consultancy Service. If because of temperamental incompatibility they cannot
live with each other then it is proper that they should jointly get a decree of
divorce by mutual consent. Both respondent no.2 and her husband are in such age
group that if proper efforts are made, their re- settlement may not be
impossible.
14.
The main question which falls for consideration in this case is whether the
High Court was justified in not exercising its inherent powers under section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the facts and circumstances of this
case?
15.
This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts'
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex
debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of
which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:
(i)
to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii)
to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
16.
Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently
taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice
and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent
power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown
Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v.
Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that
where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court
is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon
in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys [1977] AC 1 stressed the
importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the
prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive
and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned
that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional
importance and should be jealously preserved.
17.
The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very
wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be
exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution but court's failing to use the
power for advancement of justice can also lead to grave injustice. The High
Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case
where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether
factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can
be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.
18.
This court had occasion to examine the legal position in a large number of
cases. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, this court summarized
some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to
quash the proceedings:
(i) where it
manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or
continuance of the proceedings;
(ii)
where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
alleged;
(iii)
where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence
adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.
19.
This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC
699 observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles
the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the
court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil
and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding
ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher
than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws
made by the legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of
subsequent cases of this court and other courts.
20.
In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, a
three-Judge Bench of this court held as under:-
".....In
case the impugned order clearly brings out a situation which is an abuse of the
process of the court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice
interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained
in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the
High Court. Such cases would necessarily be few and far between. One such case
would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated
illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. The present case would
undoubtedly fall for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with
Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, that the invoking of the
revisional power of the High Court is impermissible."
21.
This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre & Others (1988) 1 SCC 692 observed in para 7 as
under:
"7.
The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage
is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether
the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is
also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear
in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of
justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the
court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of
the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful
purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue,
the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also
quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
22.
In State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others 1992 Supp. (1)
SCC 335, this court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Cr.P.C.) under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C.
gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this court made it clear that it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised:
"(1)
Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)
Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)
Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4)
Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5)
Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)
Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7)
Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where
the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge."
23.
In G. Sagar Suri & Another v. State of UP & Others (2000) 2 SCC 636,
this court observed that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to
exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process particularly when
matters are essentially of civil nature.
24.
This court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Others v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus:-
"It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or
quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of
fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into
the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."
25.
A three-Judge Bench (of which one of us, Bhandari, J. was the author of the
judgment) of this Court in Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of
Uttaranchal & Others (2007) 12 SCC 1 comprehensively examined the legal
position. The court came to a definite conclusion and the relevant observations
of the court are reproduced in para 24 of the said judgment as under:-
"Inherent
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by
the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court
exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to
injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified
in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific
provisions in the Statute."
26.
We have very carefully considered the averments of the complaint and the
statements of all the witnesses recorded at the time of the filing of the
complaint. There are no specific allegations against the appellants in the
complaint and none of the witnesses have alleged any role of both the
appellants.
27.
Admittedly, appellant no.1 is a permanent resident of Navasari, Surat, Gujarat
and has been living with her husband for more than seven years. Similarly,
appellant no.2 is a permanent resident of Goregaon, Maharasthra. They have
never visited the place where the alleged incident had taken place. They had
never lived with respondent no.2 and her husband. Their implication in the
complaint is meant to harass and humiliate the husband's relatives. This seems
to be the only basis to file this complaint against the appellants. Permitting
the complainant to pursue this complaint would be an abuse of the process of
law.
28.
It is a matter of common knowledge that unfortunately matrimonial litigation is
rapidly increasing in our country. All the courts in our country including this
court are flooded with matrimonial cases. This clearly demonstrates discontent
and unrest in the family life of a large number of people of the society.
29.
The courts are receiving a large number of cases emanating from section 498-A
of the Indian Penal Code which reads as under:-
"498-A.
Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For
the purposes of this section, `cruelty' means:-
(a)
any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b)
harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand."
30.
It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under section
498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without
proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which
are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time,
rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a
matter of serious concern.
31.
The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and
obligation to ensure that the social fiber of family life is not ruined or
demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should
not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are
filed either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of
the Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and
should treat every complaint under section 498-A as a basic human problem and
must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable
resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best
of their abilities to ensure that social fiber, peace and tranquility of the
society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one
complaint should not lead to multiple cases.
32.
Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and
consequences are not properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint
can lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant,
accused and his close relations.
33.
The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty
and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority
of these complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate
relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal
trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be
extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take
pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The
allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in
different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the
complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The
allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and
circumspection. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials
lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the
parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the
complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail
even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement
altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.
34.
Before parting with this case, we would like to observe that a serious relook
of the entire provision is warranted by the legislation. It is also a matter of
common knowledge that exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a
large number of complaints. The tendency of over implication is also reflected
in a very large number of cases.
35.
The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all concerned. Even ultimate
acquittal in the trial may also not be able to wipe out the deep scars of
suffering of ignominy. Unfortunately a large number of these complaints have
not only flooded the courts but also have led to enormous social unrest
affecting peace, harmony and happiness of the society. It is high time that the
legislature must take into consideration the pragmatic realities and make
suitable changes in the existing law. It is imperative for the legislature to
take into consideration the informed public opinion and the pragmatic realities
in consideration and make necessary changes in the relevant provisions of law.
We direct the Registry to send a copy of this judgment to the Law Commission and
to the Union Law Secretary, Government of India who may place it before the
Hon'ble Minister for Law & Justice to take appropriate steps in the larger
interest of the society.
36.
When the facts and circumstances of the case are considered in the background
of legal principles set out in preceding paragraphs, then it would be unfair
to compel the appellants to undergo the rigmarole of a criminal trial. In the
interest of justice, we deem it appropriate to quash the complaint against the
appellants. As a result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set
aside. Consequently, this appeal is allowed.
My PERSONAL OPINION:
Our courts are over flodeed with
huge number of cases of 498A and dowry harassment which is leading to enormous
social unrest affecting peace, harmony and happiness of the society.Maximum
cases are false and due to either ego of each other or intolerance of each
others family members. Being a educated society , which direction we are going
God only knows. in numbers of
cases family members of a man have been implicated, which they should not be
implicated in a dowry case just because their names have been mentioned in the
complaint without any specific allegation leveled against them, the Supreme
Court has said.
SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
(DALVEER BHANDARI & K.S.
RADHAKRISHNAN, JJ.)
PREETI
GUPTA & ANOTHER ---appellants
VERSUS
STATE
OF JHARKHAND & ANOTHER --Respondents
JT 2010 (8) SC 410 = (2010) 7 SCC
667 = 2010 AIR(SCW) 4975 = 2010(8) SCALE 131 = AIR 2010 SC 3363 = 2010 CRI.
L.J. 4303 = (2010) 9 SCR 1168
Criminal Appeal No. 1512 of 2010 (Arising
out of SLP (Crl.) No.4684 of 2009)-Decided on 13-08-2010.
Quashing
of Complaint – Dowery/Cruelty - Quashed
JUDGMENT
Dalveer
Bhandari, J.-Leave granted.
2.
This appeal has been filed by Preeti Gupta the married sister-in-law and a
permanent resident of Navasari, Surat, Gujarat with her husband and Gaurav
Poddar, a permanent resident of Goregaon, Maharashtra, who is the unmarried
brother-in-law of the complainant, Manisha Poddar, against the impugned
judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, Jharkhand dated 27.4.2009
passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos.304 of 2009.
3.
Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as
under: The Complainant Manisha was married to Kamal Poddar at Kanpur on
10.12.2006. Immediately after the marriage, the complainant who is respondent
no.2 in this appeal left for Mumbai along with her husband Kamal Poddar who was
working with the Tata Consultancy Services (for short "TCS") and was
permanently residing at Mumbai. The complainant also joined the TCS at Mumbai
on 23.12.2006. Respondent no.2 visited Ranchi to participate in
"Gangaur" festival (an important Hindu festival widely celebrated in
Northern India) on 16.3.2007. After staying there for a week, she returned to
Mumbai on 24.03.2007.
4.
Respondent no.2, Manisha Poddar filed a complaint on 08.07.2007 before the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi under sections 498-A, 406, 341, 323 and 120-B
of the Indian Penal Code read with sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act against all immediate relations of her husband, namely, Pyarelal Poddar
(father-in-law), Kamal Poddar (husband), Sushila Devi (mother-in-law), Gaurav
Poddar (unmarried brother-in-law) and Preeti Gupta @ Preeti Agrawal (married
sister-in-law). The complaint was transferred to the court of the Judicial
Magistrate, Ranchi. Statements of Respondent no.2 and other witnesses were
recorded and on 10.10.2008 the Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and passed
the summoning order of the appellants. The appellants are aggrieved by the said
summoning order.
5.
In the criminal complaint, it was alleged that a luxury car was demanded by
all the accused named in the complaint. It was also alleged that respondent
no.2 was physically assaulted at Mumbai. According to the said allegations of
the complainant, it appears that the alleged incidents had taken place either
at Kanpur or Mumbai. According to the averments of the complaint, except for
the demand of the luxury car no incident of harassment took place at Ranchi.
6.
According to the appellants, there was no specific allegation against both the
appellants in the complaint. Appellant no.1 had been permanently residing with
her husband at Navasari, Surat (Gujarat) for the last more than seven years.
She had never visited Mumbai during the year 2007 and never stayed with
respondent no.2 or her husband. Similarly, appellant no.2, unmarried
brother-in-law of the complainant has also been permanently residing at
Goregaon, Maharashtra.
7.
It was asserted that there is no specific allegation in the entire complaint
against both the appellants. The statements of prosecution witnesses PW1 to PW4
were also recorded along with the statement of the complainant. None of the
prosecution witnesses had stated anything against the appellants. These
appellants had very clearly stated in this appeal that they had never visited
Ranchi. The appellants also stated that they had never interfered with the internal
affairs of the complainant and her husband. According to them, there was no
question of any interference because the appellants had been living in
different cities for a number of years.
8.
It was clearly alleged by the appellants that they had been falsely implicated
in this case. It was further stated that the complaint against the appellants
was totally without any basis or foundation. The appellants also asserted that
even if all the allegations incorporated in the complaint were taken to be true,
even then no offence could be made out against them.
9.
The appellants had submitted that the High Court ought to have quashed this
complaint as far as both the appellants are concerned because there were no
specific allegations against the appellants and they ought not have been
summoned. In the impugned judgment, while declining to exercise its inherent
powers, the High Court observed as under:
"In
this context, I may again reiterate that the acts relating to demand or
subjecting to cruelty, as per the complaint petition, have been committed at
the place where the complainant was living with her husband. However, the
complainant in her statement made under solemn affirmation has stated that when
she came to Ranchi on the occasion of Holi, all the accused persons came and
passed sarcastic remarks which in absence of actual wordings, according to the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner could never be presumed to be an
act constituting offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code."
10.
In this appeal, both the appellants specifically asserted that they had never
visited Ranchi, therefore, the allegations that they made any sarcastic remarks
to the complainant had no basis or foundation as far as the appellants are
concerned.
11.
The complainant could not dispute that appellant no.1 was a permanent resident
living with her husband at Navasari, Surat, Gujarat for the last more than
seven years and the appellant no.2 was permanent resident of Goregaon,
Maharashtra. They had never spent any time with respondent no.2.
12.
According to the appellants, they are not the residents of Ranchi and if they
are compelled to attend the Ranchi Court repeatedly then that would lead to
insurmountable harassment and inconvenience to the appellants as well as to the
complainant.
13. The complaint in this case under section 498-A IPC has
led to several other cases. It is mentioned that a divorce petition has been
filed by the husband of respondent no.2. Both respondent no.2 and her husband
are highly qualified and are working with reputed organization like Tata
Consultancy Service. If because of temperamental incompatibility they cannot
live with each other then it is proper that they should jointly get a decree of
divorce by mutual consent. Both respondent no.2 and her husband are in such age
group that if proper efforts are made, their re- settlement may not be
impossible.
14.
The main question which falls for consideration in this case is whether the
High Court was justified in not exercising its inherent powers under section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the facts and circumstances of this
case?
15.
This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts'
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex
debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of
which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:
(i)
to give effect to an order under the Code;
(ii)
to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
(iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
16.
Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently
taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice
and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent
power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown
Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v.
Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that
where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court
is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon
in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys [1977] AC 1 stressed the
importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the
prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive
and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned
that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional
importance and should be jealously preserved.
17.
The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very
wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be
exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution but court's failing to use the
power for advancement of justice can also lead to grave injustice. The High
Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case
where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not
been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether
factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can
be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage.
18.
This court had occasion to examine the legal position in a large number of
cases. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, this court summarized
some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to
quash the proceedings:
(i) where it
manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or
continuance of the proceedings;
(ii)
where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
alleged;
(iii)
where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence
adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.
19.
This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC
699 observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles
the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that
allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the
court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil
and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding
ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher
than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws
made by the legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of
subsequent cases of this court and other courts.
20.
In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, a
three-Judge Bench of this court held as under:-
".....In
case the impugned order clearly brings out a situation which is an abuse of the
process of the court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice
interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained
in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the
High Court. Such cases would necessarily be few and far between. One such case
would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated
illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. The present case would
undoubtedly fall for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with
Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, that the invoking of the
revisional power of the High Court is impermissible."
21.
This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre & Others (1988) 1 SCC 692 observed in para 7 as
under:
"7.
The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage
is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether
the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is
also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear
in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of
justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the
court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of
the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful
purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue,
the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also
quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."
22.
In State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others 1992 Supp. (1)
SCC 335, this court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, Cr.P.C.) under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226
of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C.
gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this court made it clear that it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised:
"(1)
Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2)
Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if
any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3)
Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4)
Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.
(5)
Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)
Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7)
Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where
the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge."
23.
In G. Sagar Suri & Another v. State of UP & Others (2000) 2 SCC 636,
this court observed that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to
exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process particularly when
matters are essentially of civil nature.
24.
This court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Others v. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus:-
"It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or
quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When
no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of
fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into
the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."
25.
A three-Judge Bench (of which one of us, Bhandari, J. was the author of the
judgment) of this Court in Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of
Uttaranchal & Others (2007) 12 SCC 1 comprehensively examined the legal
position. The court came to a definite conclusion and the relevant observations
of the court are reproduced in para 24 of the said judgment as under:-
"Inherent
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by
the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court
exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to
injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified
in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific
provisions in the Statute."
26.
We have very carefully considered the averments of the complaint and the
statements of all the witnesses recorded at the time of the filing of the
complaint. There are no specific allegations against the appellants in the
complaint and none of the witnesses have alleged any role of both the
appellants.
27.
Admittedly, appellant no.1 is a permanent resident of Navasari, Surat, Gujarat
and has been living with her husband for more than seven years. Similarly,
appellant no.2 is a permanent resident of Goregaon, Maharasthra. They have
never visited the place where the alleged incident had taken place. They had
never lived with respondent no.2 and her husband. Their implication in the
complaint is meant to harass and humiliate the husband's relatives. This seems
to be the only basis to file this complaint against the appellants. Permitting
the complainant to pursue this complaint would be an abuse of the process of
law.
28.
It is a matter of common knowledge that unfortunately matrimonial litigation is
rapidly increasing in our country. All the courts in our country including this
court are flooded with matrimonial cases. This clearly demonstrates discontent
and unrest in the family life of a large number of people of the society.
29.
The courts are receiving a large number of cases emanating from section 498-A
of the Indian Penal Code which reads as under:-
"498-A.
Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For
the purposes of this section, `cruelty' means:-
(a)
any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b)
harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand."
30.
It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under section
498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without
proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which
are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time,
rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a
matter of serious concern.
31.
The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and
obligation to ensure that the social fiber of family life is not ruined or
demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should
not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are
filed either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of
the Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and
should treat every complaint under section 498-A as a basic human problem and
must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable
resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best
of their abilities to ensure that social fiber, peace and tranquility of the
society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one
complaint should not lead to multiple cases.
32.
Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and
consequences are not properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint
can lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant,
accused and his close relations.
33.
The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty
and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority
of these complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate
relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal
trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be
extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take
pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The
allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in
different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the
complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The
allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and
circumspection. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials
lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the
parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the
complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail
even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement
altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.
34.
Before parting with this case, we would like to observe that a serious relook
of the entire provision is warranted by the legislation. It is also a matter of
common knowledge that exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a
large number of complaints. The tendency of over implication is also reflected
in a very large number of cases.
35.
The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all concerned. Even ultimate
acquittal in the trial may also not be able to wipe out the deep scars of
suffering of ignominy. Unfortunately a large number of these complaints have
not only flooded the courts but also have led to enormous social unrest
affecting peace, harmony and happiness of the society. It is high time that the
legislature must take into consideration the pragmatic realities and make
suitable changes in the existing law. It is imperative for the legislature to
take into consideration the informed public opinion and the pragmatic realities
in consideration and make necessary changes in the relevant provisions of law.
We direct the Registry to send a copy of this judgment to the Law Commission and
to the Union Law Secretary, Government of India who may place it before the
Hon'ble Minister for Law & Justice to take appropriate steps in the larger
interest of the society.
36.
When the facts and circumstances of the case are considered in the background
of legal principles set out in preceding paragraphs, then it would be unfair
to compel the appellants to undergo the rigmarole of a criminal trial. In the
interest of justice, we deem it appropriate to quash the complaint against the
appellants. As a result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set
aside. Consequently, this appeal is allowed.
My PERSONAL OPINION:
Our courts are over flodeed with
huge number of cases of 498A and dowry harassment which is leading to enormous
social unrest affecting peace, harmony and happiness of the society.Maximum
cases are false and due to either ego of each other or intolerance of each
others family members. Being a educated society , which direction we are going
God only knows. in numbers of
cases family members of a man have been implicated, which they should not be
implicated in a dowry case just because their names have been mentioned in the
complaint without any specific allegation leveled against them, the Supreme
Court has said.
