Thursday, September 15, 2016

M/s Helios & Matheson Information Technology Limited - Liquidation order

Liquidation Order

1. M/s Helios & Matheson Information Technology Limited [for short, 'the Company'] having its Registered Office at Mahindra World City carrying on the business of developing, producing and selling computer, communication software, hardware and other related products for clients in India and carrying on the business of providing training, technical, manpower and other consultancy related to information technology to both Indian and overseas clients, has the authorized share capital of Rs. 50,00,00,000/- consisting of 4,00,00,000 equity share of Rs.10/-.

2. From the materials available on record, it is seen that the Company had engaged the services of financial brokers such as Bajaj Capital, Mahavir Group, Almondz Global Securities Limited, Western Securities for mobilising fixed deposits from the public on commission basis. In such transaction, the Company, through its agents as well as directly from the public, had received a total amount of Rs.55,25,70,000/- as deposits from 6540 depositors all over the country.

3.      While so, lot of complaints started pouring in regarding non-refund of the moneys invested by the depositors. Despite the statutory notice issued by the depositors and issuance of notice under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act demanding payment, the amounts remain unpaid. Hence, some of the aggrieved depositors have approached this Court with the present petitions invoking Section 433 (e) and 434(1)(a) read with Section 433(f) of the Companies Act, 1956 for ordering winding up of the Company and for appointment of Official Liquidator to take charge of the assets thereof.

4. Pending proceedings, on 01.4.2015, Economic Offences Wing – II, Chennai, registered a case against the Company in Crime No. 5 of 2015 under Section 5 of the TNPID Act and 420 IPC. On investigation, the authorities, finding that the Company failed to honour the promises made to the depositors and defaulted without repaying the deposit amount and interest and also finding that it has liabilities with Banks and depositors to the tune of Rs.245,02,03,434.82, froze the accounts of the Company. The authorities also found that the company is having business with a turnover
of Rs.448.95 Crores.

5. In such circumstance, the Company filed petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Criminal Original Petition No. 11760 of 2015 seeking for a direction to the authorities to de-freeze its accounts with various Banks and also the accounts of the other petitioners and in such proceeding, the said petition was clubbed with the main Company Petitions.

6.      On 27.4.2015, this Court directed the respondent Company to submit a statement or scheme of repayment for the depositors. Accordingly, the respondent filed a memo on 29.4.2015 along with a repayment scheme to show the bona fide in settling all legitimate dues of stakeholders and also to show that it has never been its intention to defraud any person. Significantly, the said Scheme was subsequently revised by the respondent Company by its affidavit dated 25.7.2015 in line with the new provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

7.      Meanwhile, the Company filed an application being C.A. No. 561 of 2015 seeking to accept the schedule of re-payment under a Scheme drawn by them and this Court, by order dated 03.6.2015, directed for publication in All India Edition of Times with regard to the Scheme besides directing the Company to furnish copy of the Scheme to the depositors on request. In view of the above proposal made by the Company for settling the depositors, this Court also directed the Police to proceed with further investigation into the complaints without affecting the personal liberty of the individuals and adjourned the case to 13.7.2015. Pending, another application was taken out by the Company in C.A. No. 624 of 2015 seeking for a direction to the Crime Branch, EOW – I, Division – VII of State of Maharashtra, not to harass its directors and to abide by and follow the directions of this Court in
the earlier order. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the fact that the earlier order passed on 03.6.2015, restrained the Police from proceeding against the personal liberty of the individuals of the Company, this Court, vide order dated 23.6.2015, clarified that the said order does not confine to Tamil Nadu alone but it applies throughout the State wherever the depositors make a complaint.

8. In the interregnum, the Company invoked writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in W.P. No. 14664 of 2015 for declaration that registration of the above FIR was without jurisdiction and the same was dismissed by order dated 06.8.2015. The challenge made in W.A. No. 1227 of 2015 before the Division Bench also met the same fate on 28.8.2015.

9.      When the matter stood thus, serendipitously, even before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Company in liquidation had obtained an order of protection on 24.9.2015 in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 7961 of 2015 by making a statement to the effect that it is working out for a scheme to revive the Company to its original shape. Again, the respondent tried its luck before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1270 of 2015 wherein, Their Lordships, on 01.10.2015, passed a conditional order to the effect that a sum of Rs.10 Crores should be deposited within four weeks and the balance amount of Rs. 38 Crores within one year from the date of order, in equal installments failing which proceedings could be revived for taking coercive action. By virtue of the said order, with a view to enable the investors to deposit money, certain accounts of the Company in liquidation, were directed to be de-freezed by this Court vide order dated 09.10.2015, with further observation that weekly statement of account should be furnished. Again, the matter was called in the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 30.10.2015 and because the Company had not yet met the deadline as mandated by its earlier order, the Criminal Appeal itself was dismissed.

10.    Since the above direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 01.10.2015 was not complied with, this Court, after hearing the Company Petitions extensively, reserved orders on 30.10.2015. Thereafter, it is only at the instance of the respondent company, based on the letter dated 04.11.2015 circulated by the learned counsel, the matter was posted for clarification on 06.11.2015. On that day, learned counsel for the respondent Company, besides expressing hope in honouring the debts, with a view to show his bona fide, produced two Demand Drafts for a sum of Rs.5 Crores and Rs.50 Lakhs, which are lying in the credit of C.P. Nos. 143 to 145 of 2015 and the matter stood adjourned to 20.11.2015 for further clarification. After payment of the said amount of Rs.5,50,00,000/- as against the conditional order to deposit Rs. 10 Crores, the respondent Company, somehow or other, managed to drag on the matter. In fact, learned counsel for the respondent company repeatedly requested for time representing across the bar that the Management is willing to settle the dues of the depositors but the promises made were not kept up by paying the amounts as per the earlier direction.

11.     While so, on 18.12.2015, the respondent Company has filed a memo stating that properties, which are secured assets, standing in the names of the wives of the Directors were sold by them and the proceeds, after settlement with the concerned Banks, were deposited to this Court.

12.    Simultaneously, the Investigating Officer, viz., the Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW – II, has filed Status Report on 18.12.2015 to the effect that the respondent Company received a sum of Rs.55,25,70,000/- as deposit from 6540 depositors all over India of which, 1046 depositors have lodged complaints against the Company before EOW to the tune of Rs.46,04,42,000/- throughout the country and the interest defaulted by the company is totally to the tune of Rs.72,81,667/- to the depositors. It is further stated in the report that by virtue of the orders of this Court dated 03.6.2015 and 23.6.2015 in C.A. No. 561 of 2015 not to arrest the Directors, some of the Directors, who are A.4 to A.6, have not appeared for interrogation and not co-operated for investigation. For effective investigation to protect the interest of the depositors, the Investigating Officer also sought for setting aside the above orders dated 03.6.2015 and 23.6.2015 passed in C.A. No. 561 of 2015.

13.      At this juncture, this Court finds it necessary to mention that during the course of proceedings, the learned counsel for the respondent Company also submitted that the Management could generate funds from the subsidiary Company functioning in New York but not even a whisper is made regarding the details of the same. The respondent Company, on more than one occasion, though promised to repay the depositors in a phased manner, has not so far disclosed the full details regarding the source of funds for such repayment. Nor the whereabouts of the deposits received is exposed.  On the other hand, the respondent only attempted to deviate and confuse the entire issue by submitting a revised scheme, which is clearly unworkable. The attitude of the respondent Company by repeatedly making representations and requesting time before this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court reveals that the Management has acted in a surreptitious manner so as to purchase breathing time to sell the properties. It is also pertinent to note that the respondent Company, undaunted by the pendency of several proceedings before various Courts across the country, has gone to the extent of selling the properties clandestinely subsequent to the orders, ie., on 24.11.2015 and 06.11.2015. The said act of selling the properties shows that the respondent Company has no respect for the Court orders and it is not only flagrant violation of the orders of this Court but is also contumacious. At the worst, they ought to have deposited the entire amount to the credit of the petition. The reason given by the learned counsel that the said properties were secured assets, does not seem to be genuine. No one can be allowed to play hide and seek with the Court.

14.     Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Status Report filed by the Investigation Officer speak about the sale of the two properties and disbursement of the sale proceeds. It is seen that the property standing in the name of Tmt. Annapurna, W/o A-2 G. Muralikrishna, was sold for Rs. 11 Crores whereas a sum of Rs. 1 Crore only was paid to the credit of this case. The break-up of the disbursement would show that a sum of Rs. 1,45,00,000/- was paid towards Advance Tax and it has been shown as if some repayment of loans was paid for which no proof is produced. Likewise, the other property belonging to one Tmt. Padmaja, W/o A-7 V. Ramachandran, has been sold for Rs.15 Crores of which, an amount of Rs. 5 Crores alone was paid to the credit of the petition. In that sale also, a sum of Rs.1,50,00,000/- has been paid towards Advance Tax. In both the sales, an amount of Rs. 14 Lakhs and Rs. 54 Lakhs respectively is shown as balance and the same stands undisputed.

15.     It cannot be denied that payment of Advance Tax is statutory. But, in the circumstances of the given case, this Court is of the opinion that the payment of Advance Tax of Rs. 2,95,00,000/- could have been deferred. Further more, the balance amount of Rs.68 Lakhs has not been brought to the knowledge of this Court by the respondent. Going by the records, it is seen that had the above amount of Rs. 3,63,00,000/- been pumped in, some of the depositors could have been cleared. Therefore, it is clear that there is no bona fide in the attitude of the respondent.

16.    The failure of the respondent Company to refund the deposits made with them, has, indeed, led to public outcry against the scam on account of the huge amount that was collected by the respondent by defrauding a very large section of the public. From the status report, it is clear that the problem is extremely complex. But inspite of long rope given to them, the company in liquidation, though consistently defending to be a growing concern, has not arrived at any settlement.

17.    Therefore, it is construed from the available facts and circumstances and the documents produced before this Court that the respondent Company has become commercially insolvent and it is unable to clear its dues to the petitioners herein and other depositors. Obviously, in the considered opinion of this Court, the Company has siphoned off the funds and it appears that the respondent company is unreliable and it cannot be believed any further.

18.    Insofar as the appointment of Official Liquidator is concerned, indisputably, it is clear that the Company does not own any tangible assets and even the intellectual properties such as books and papers, have already been taken by the EOW. However, it is seen that despite several coercive proceedings, the Company has been functioning and the employees are said to be paid by their clients. But the continuous assurances by the respondent Company before the Court of law is a clear indication that the Management continues to indulge in prevarication and is using technical jargons to defeat the rights of the depositors. Therefore, to meet the ends of justice, this Court is of the view that it is inevitable to appoint Official Liquidator to take over the affairs of the respondent Company so that monies which are truly realizable are not frittered away by further siphoning of the funds.

19.    In view of the veracity involved in the case, I am of the opinion that the petitioners have made out a prima facie case for admission of the Company Petitions. In such circumstance, this Court is left with no other option but to pass the following common order in all the above Company Petitions:-
Admit.
(i)  Notice on the Court Notice Board / Company.

(ii)  Notice to the respondent.

(iii)  Notice to the Registrar of Companies, Chennai

(iv)  Affixture of notice at the premises of the Registered Office of the respondent Company.

(v) The petitioners are directed to publish the Company Petitions in the National Editions of “THE HINDU” and  “NEW INDIAN EXPRESS”, and in the Central (Tamil Nadu) Government Gazette fixing the date of hearing on 18.03.2016.

(vi) The petitioners are directed to publish the Company Petitions giving at least 21 days clear advance notice.

(vii)  The Official Liquidator, High Court, Madras, is appointed as Provisional Liquidator and is directed to take charge of the assets of the respondent Company. The Ex-Directors of the respondent Company are directed to file their statement of affairs before the Official Liquidator within a period of 21 days.

20.    Promises are like crying babies in a theater, they should be carried out at once. The Scheme sought to be proposed, in the instant case, seems to be an eyewash and the attempt of the respondent Company to conceal, swallow its words and representations cannot be permitted since it is a deliberate attempt to hoodwink and bypass the Court orders. This Court is also of the opinion that vast amount may have been stashed away. Keeping in view the seriousness in the allegations and having regard to the nature of fraud involved and the investigation, its slow pace so far, and also the non-seriousness on the part of the respondent Company, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need to entrust this matter to the Serious Fraud Investigation.

21.    Accordingly, this Court suo motu directs the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to direct the Serious Fraud Investigating Office to inquire into the affairs of the respondent Company and the Serious Fraud Investigating Office is directed to file a report before this Court on or before 18.3.2016.

22.    Consequent upon passing of such order as above in all the above Company Petitions, the remaining applications pending in these petitions are closed.


C.P. Nos. 143 to 145 of 2015, 414 to 416 of 2015

So Now SFIO is investigating the fraud done by company
Official liquidator attached to High Court of Chennai appointed

Thanks & Regards
Dr. Zulfiqar Ali Khan, M.A., M.L.,M.Phil(Law),Ph.D
Advocate & Commissioner of Oaths
No. 462,  Addl law Chambers
High Court of Madras
Chennai- 600 104
MB: 9884102961 / 9444412961


Helios & Matheson Information Technology Ltd, Appeal Before High Court of Chennai Bench short Note on WA order


APPEAL BEFORE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS BENCH:
APPEAL was filed by M/s Helios and Matheson Information Technology Ltd:
WA NO. 1227 of 2015

SHORT NOTE:

This writ appeal arises out of an order passed by the learned single Judge dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant, praying for a declaration that a First Information Report registered against them in Crime No.5/2015 on the file of the Economic Offences Wing of the City Police was without jurisdiction.

PRELUDE

1. It appears that the appellant herein was originally incorporated as a Public Limited Company under the name and style of "Express Financial Limited", having its office at T.Nagar, Chennai. It was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 on 8.3.1991. Subsequently, the name of the company was changed to its present form namely "Helios and Matheson Information Technology Limited", with effect from 29.4.1999.

2. Even according to the appellant, they were accepting deposits from the public as well as the shareholders for over 10 years, in terms of Section 58-A of the Companies Act, 1956 and that they were very prompt in repayment.

3. But after the replacement of The Companies Act, 1956 by the Companies Act, 2013, a new set of provisions from Sections 73 to 76 in Chapter V dealing with "Acceptance of Deposits by Companies" have comeinto force.

4. Under Section 74(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, every company which has accepted a deposit before the commencement of the 2013 Act,was obliged to file a statement with the Registrar of Companies, if the amount of such deposit or any interest due thereon, remained unpaid on the commencement of the Act. There was also a prohibition under the 2013 Companies Act, for such companies from accepting new deposits, unless two conditions namely (i) shareholders' approval at an Annual General Meeting and (ii) a credit rating of A++ by CRISIL, are fulfilled.

5. Even according to the appellant, they could not fulfil both the conditions required for acceptance of fresh deposits under the Companies Act, 2013. The appellant was also admittedly in default in repayment of the deposits as well as the interest, to a huge number of depositors, as on the date of commencement of the 2013 Companies Act. It is the appellant's own case that they were in the habit of receiving fresh deposits for repayment of the old deposits and this chain was cut, at the commencement of the 2013 Companies Act.

6. As a consequence, several complaints came to be lodged with the City Police and it appears that during the period from September 2014 to January 2015, the police started investigating into the complaints. The first ever First Information Report was registered against the appellant in Crime No.02 of 2015 on 29.1.2015 by one Mr.D.Ramalingam. It appears that the amount due to the said D.Ramalingam was only around Rs.2,19,020/- and this money was settled by the appellant.

7. Thereafter, the appellant moved an application before the Company Law Board under Section 74(2) of the Companies Act, 2013. The application was actually filed on 27.3.2015. The reliefs sought in the application were:

(a) to extend the time for repayment of the deposits matured on or before
31.3.2014 by a further period of 6 months; and

(b) to extend the time for repayment of the deposits matured after 31.3.2014 by a further period of one year. But, by the time the application under section 74 (2) was filed, the period of 6 months sought by the appellant in para 16(a) of their petition before the Company Law Board had already expired. The prayer sought in para 16(b) was to expire in a period of 4 days, when the petition under Section 74(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 was presented.

8. While so, on 1.4.2015, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Economic Offences Wing-II, Anna Nagar, received a complaint from one Dr.K.Ranjit Chitturi alleging that the appellant herein received deposits from investors for durations of 12, 24 and 36 months and that the defacto complainant himself made 5 deposits to the total tune of Rs.59,50,000/- during the period from 11.7.2011 to 16.12.2013. It was claimed by the defacto complainant that 3 out of 5 deposits matured on 14.5.2014, 12.6.2014 and 11.7.2014 respectively, but the appellant failed to repay the deposit amount.

9. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Economic Offences Wing, Anna Nagar registered a First Information Report in Crime No.05/2015 for an alleged offence under Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act 1997 read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. In the First Information Report, the appellant herein as well as its Directors were cited as accused. Immediately after the registration of the FIR in Crime No.5 of 2015, the Managing Director and 2 other directors of the appellant were arrested and remanded to judicial 5custody on 1.4.2015.

10. Therefore, the appellant moved a writ petition in W.P.No.10015 of 2015, challenging the Constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act 1997, in the light of the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013.

11. It is relevant to point out here that as soon as the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997 was enacted, the Constitutional validity of the same was challenged way back in 1999, but the challenge was thrown out by a learned judge of this Court in Thiru Muruga Finance v. State of Tamil Nadu [2000 (2) CTC 609]. Despite this decision, a fresh challenge was made to the Constitutional validity of the Act, once again in the year 2006 and a Full Bench of this Court upheld the Act for a second time in S.Bagavathy v. State [2007 (2) CTC 207].

12. Therefore, the writ petition W.P.No.10015 of 2015 filed by the appellant herein, challenging the Constitutional validity of Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997 was actually a third round of challenge (though not by the appellant) to the very same Legislation. Realizing the futility of such a challenge, during the course of hearing of the writ petition, the appellant withdrew the writ petition with liberty to raise all the contentions, in a quash petition to be filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking the quashing of the FIR in Crime No.05 of 2015.

13. Thereafter, the appellant moved a petition in Crl.O.P.No. 9982 of 2015 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for quashing the FIR in Crime No.05 of 2015. It is claimed by the appellant that the quash petition was also withdrawn by them, leaving all the contentions open to be raised at the appropriate forum and at the appropriate stage. But the records reveal that the quash petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 20.4.2015 by an order which reads as follows:

"The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has sought permission of this Court to withdraw the petition and he had also made an endorsement to that effect.

2. In view of the endorsement made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Criminal original Petition is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to put forth all the contentions which is raised today before the appropriate forum. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed"

14. After (i) withdrawing the writ petition W.P.No. 10015 of 2015 challenging the Constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Act, with liberty to raise all contentions in the quash petition and (ii) after withdrawing the quash petition itself with liberty to merely put forth all contentions before the appropriate forum, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in W.P.No.14664 of 2015 praying for the issue of a writ of declaration that the FIR in Crime No.5 of 2015 was without jurisdiction and ultra vires. We do not know how after the withdrawal of the quash petition under section 482 of the Code, another quash petition under Article 226 is maintainable on the specious plea that they had obtained liberty to move the appropriate forum.

15. Be that as it may, the writ petition for quashing the FIR, has now been dismissed by a learned Judge, by an order passed on 6.8.2015. Aggrieved by the dismissal of their writ petition, the appellant is before us.

16. Thus, in essence, the litigation before us is virtually a third attempt on the part of the appellant to stall an investigation by the respondent police, into serious allegations of defrauding of thousands of depositors to the tune of Crores of rupees. The first attempt made by the appellant was in the form of a writ petition challenging the Constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Act. The second attempt made by the appellant was in the form of a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to quash the FIR. While the first writ petition was withdrawn with liberty to raise all contentions in the quash petition, the quash petition itself, is said to have been withdrawn with liberty to raise all the contentions at the appropriate forum. Therefore, the present attempt, which is the third attempt in succession, to stall an investigation, required a careful scrutiny and this is what was done by the learned Judge, before coming to the conclusion that the writ petition was devoid of merits.

TURN OF EVENTS BEFORE THE LEARNED JUDGE

17. It is seen from the affidavit filed by the appellant in support of the writ petition as well as the summary of arguments and additional written arguments filed by the appellant before the learned Judge that the appellant raised two fundamental issues for seeking a declaration that the First Information Report was without jurisdiction. They are:

(i) Whether the company which is not in the business of receiving deposits,but which received deposits in terms of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, can be prosecuted for an offence under Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the TNPID Act, especially when there is a specific provision under Section 74(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 enabling the company to approach the Company Law Board for extension of time to repay the deposits? and

(ii) Whether the police would have jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the matters under the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997, without the sanction of the competent authority ?

18. On the first question, the learned single Judge, to some extent, agreed with the contention that unless a company was carrying on the business of receiving deposits, it would not come within the definition of the expression "financial establishment" under Section 2(3) of the TNPID Act, 1997. But, nevertheless the learned Judge found from the website of the appellant company that the same contained a representation to the public that the appellant was engaged in the business of banking and financial services. The Directors' report for 2012-2013 filed by the appellant with the Registrar of Companies also contained an indication that the business focus of the appellant continued to be of banking and financial services. Therefore, the learned Judge rejected the first contention of the appellant.

19. On the second contention, heavy reliance was placed by the appellant, on the fact that in P.S.Chellamuthu v. State [SLP (Criminal)No.53/2009], the Supreme Court was already seized of the issue as to whether the police would have jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the matters under the TNPID Act, 1997 without the sanction of the competent authority. One learned Judge of this Court answered this question in the affirmative and the Supreme Court not only granted leave on the same question of law, but also granted stay. Consequently, several financial establishments have obtained stay of investigation from this Court and hence, the appellant contended on the second question that he was also entitled to the same benefit. But the said argument was rejected by the learned Judge on the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in several decisions including the one in Shree Chamundi Moped Limited v. Church of South India Trust Association [1992 (3) SCC -1], wherein the Supreme Court held that the grant of leave and the grant of an interim order by the Supreme Court as against a judgment of the High Court does not have the effect of wiping out the law laid down by the High Court. At the most, it can be said that the issue had not attained finality with an authoritative pronouncement from the Supreme Court.

20. The appellant had also raised a few other contentions before the learned single Judge, but they were all incidental to the above two main grounds of attack. All those ancillary grounds fell like a pack of cards, once the two main grounds indicated above were decided by the learned Judge against the appellant. Therefore, aggrieved by the dismissal of their writ petition, the appellant is before us.
                                                                     
A BRIEF INTERLUDE

i.)   As we have stated earlier, the appellant and its Directors came under the Police Scanner, in September, 2014. After calling upon the appellant to furnish details of deposits collected and not repaid, the police registered the first criminal complaint in Crime No.02 of 2015 on 29.1.2015 at the behest of a depositor by name D.Ramalingam. It appears that the amount payable to the said complainant was Rs.2,19,020/-. The appellant appears to have paid the said amount and hence the complaint was not investigated further.

ii.) Realizing that the settlement of the deposit amount to one depositor would not resolve the larger problem relating to thousands of depositors, the appellant filed an application on 27.3.2015 before the Regional Bench of the Company Law Board under Section 74(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, praying for two reliefs. As we have indicated earlier, the first relief prayed in paragraph 16(a) was for extending the time for repayment of the deposits that matured for payment on or before 31.3.2014 by a further period of six months. The prayer in paragraph 16(b) was to
extend the time for repayment of the deposits that mature on or after 31.3.2014 by a further period of one year.

iii.)  But, before the Company Law Board could proceed with the hearing of the application under Section 74(2) of the Companies Act, 2013,a second complaint came to be lodged on 1.4.2015 by one Dr. Ranjit Chitturi, alleging non repayment of the deposits to the tune of Rs.59,50,000/-, the Economic Offences Wing registered the complaint in Crime No.05 of 2015 and started investigation in a serious manner.

iv.)  The investigation revealed that the appellant was originally incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 on 8.3.1991 with the name Express Financial Limited. But the name was changed on 29.4.1999 to what it is now. The investigation also revealed that the appellant has 7 subsidiary companies, some of which are also incorporated outside India.

v.)  As per the statement furnished by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Economic Offences Wing before the learned single Judge, the appellant had engaged the services of several finance brokers such as (i) Bajaj Capital; (ii) Karvy Stock Brokering Limited; (iii) Mahavir Group; (iv) Mehta Finance Services Private Limited; (v) Almondz Global Securities Limited; (vi) R.K. Investments; (vii) Samantha Investments; and (viii) Western Securities, for mobilising fixed deposits from the public on commission basis. Through these agents, as well as directly from the public, the appellant had received a total amount of Rs.55,25,70,000/-, as deposits from 6540 depositors all over the country. Once the Economic Offences Wing started investigating into the crime No.05 of 2015, lot of complaints started pouring in. It appears that 745 depositors have given complaints alleging that they have been cheated to the tune of Rs.28,29,86,000/-. Many of the depositors are stated to be senior citizens.

vi.) The investigation also revealed that the appellant has debts due to 5 banks to the total tune of Rs.189,76,33,434/-. When the Economic Offences Wing froze the accounts of the appellant, they found that what was available with the banks was only a meagre
amount of Rs.2,01,476/-.

vii.)  As soon as the police activated the investigation and arrested the Managing Director and 2 other Directors, the appellant filed a writ petition in W.P.No.10015 of 2015 seeking a declaration that the provisions of the TNPID Act, 1997, are inapplicable to companies receiving deposits under the Companies Act (S.58 of the Old Act of 1956 and S.73-76 of the New Act of 2013) which are not 'Non Banking Finance Corporations' nor 'Financial Establishments'.

viii.)  After facing hostile weather in court, the appellant withdrew the writ petition with liberty. That the appellant faced hostile weather could be well understood by the fact that the Constitutional validity of the Act was already upheld, first by a single Judge of this Court in Thiru Muruga Finance v. State of Tamil Nadu [2000 (2) CTC 609] and then by a Full Bench in a second attempt made in S.Bagavathy v. State [2007 (2) CTC207]. The Judgment of the Full Bench upholding the Constitutional validity of the Act also received the seal of approval from the Supreme Court in
K.K.Baskaran v. State [(2011) 3 SCC 793]. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the appellant in W.P.No.10015 of 2015 was nothing but an attempt at re-agitating the same issue and hence after finding that it was an exercise in futility, the appellant chose to withdraw the writ petition. The order of the Division Bench dated 7.4.2015 dismissing the said writ petition W.P.No.10015 of 2015 is reproduced as follows:-

"After arguing at length, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to withdraw the writ petition and states that he reserves liberty to move appropriate quashing proceedings, n which he will raise the issues, as are sought to be canvassed before this Court.

2.Writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn in afore said terms. No costs. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2015 is also dismissed"

ix.)     In the meantime, three depositors came up before the Company Court and moved petitions in C.P.Nos.143 to 145 of 2015 under Section 433(e) and 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956, for winding up the appellant. Along with the petitions for winding up, the creditors also filed interlocutory applications for the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator. On the applications for the appointment of Provisional Liquidator, the Company Court passed an order on 30.3.2015, directing the issue of notice to the appellant returnable by 07.4.2015.

x.) While responding to those winding up petitions, the appellant claimed that they had already moved an application under Section 74 of the Companies Act, 2013 before the Company Law Board, praying for extension of time to repay the deposits. But unfortunately for the appellant, the Scheme of Chapter V of the Companies Act, 2013, is completely different from the Scheme of Chapter XV. While Chapter V deals with "Acceptance of Deposits by Companies", from Sections 73 to 76, Chapter XV deals with  "Compromises, Arrangements and Amalgamations" from Sections 230 to 240.

xi.)  Therefore, whenever a company proposes to make an arrangement with its creditors, especially when a petition for winding up is pending, the same could be done only before the Company Court (until the constitution of the Tribunal). The purpose of Section 74(2) is merely to grant time to the company to repay the deposit as well as the interest. But, in a Scheme of Arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013, it is possible even to reduce the amount payable, subject to certain conditions.

xii.)  In this case, the company petitions in C.P.Nos.143 to 145 of 2015 for the winding up of the appellant company were filed on 10.3.2015 by the depositors/creditors. They were found to be in order and numbered on 26.3.2015. It was only thereafter that the appellant filed the petition under Section 74(2) before the Company Law Board on 27.3.2015. In other words, on the date on which the appellant presented an application before the Company Law Board under Section 74(2), three petitions for winding up had already been filed before this Court.

xiii.)  Therefore, the appellant agreed, when the company petitions came up for hearing, to file an application before the Company Court itself for accepting a schedule of payment. But, the appellant could not file such an application during the period from 01.4.2015 to 27.4.2015, since the Managing Director and two other Directors of the appellant were in judicial custody at that time.

xiv.)  But, during the first week of May 2015, the appellant filed a quash petition in Crl.O.P.No. 9982 of 2015 (and not 11760 of 2015 as wrongly mentioned in the writ petition) under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the FIR in Crime No.05 of 2015. But the same was also withdrawn by the appellant, obviously due to heavy turbulence in court hall.

xv.)  Though the appellant sought to withdraw the quash petition with liberty only to raise all contentions at the appropriate forum, they came up with a writ petition in W.P.No.14664 of 2015, for the very same prayer. It is out of the dismissal of the said writ petition that the present appeal arises.

xvi.)  Therefore, the analysis of the legal issues raised forcibly by the learned senior counsel for the appellant cannot be done without taking note of the above factual details and without remembering the cry and curses of more than 6500 depositors.

FIRST CONTENTION BEFORE US

1. As we have indicated earlier, the first contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the provisions of TNPID Act, 1997, are not intended to deal with the inability to repay, of the companies not engaged in the business of receiving deposits, but to penalise only those fraudulent financial establishments that are engaged in the business of receiving deposits. Therefore, it is his contention that the provisions of TNPID Act, 1997, cannot be invoked against all kinds of companies such as the appellant herein, which is engaged only in the business of providing software solutions and not in the business of receiving deposits.

2. Either during the course of investigation or at the worse during the trial, the appellant can always establish that they never carried on the business of receiving deposits under any Scheme or Arrangement or in any other manner, so as to come within the purview of the definition of the expression "financial establishment" under Section 2(3) of the TNPID Act, 1997. The FIR cannot be quashed on the basis of an assertion in an affidavit filed before the Court that the appellant is not carrying on
the business of receiving deposits. The Investigating Officer has found at least prima facie

(i) that the appellant had engaged the services of 8 or 9 finance brokers, and

(ii) that through them and even directly, the appellant had collected deposits from about 6540 depositors throughout the country,
to the total tune of more than Rs.55 Crores.

3. Therefore, the learned Judge was right in refusing to adjudicate in a writ petition under Article 226 for quashing an FIR, the question as to whether the appellant is carrying on the business of receiving deposits or not. Hence, the first contention of the appellant has to be rejected.  Accordingly, it is rejected.

SECOND CONTENTION

4. As we have pointed out earlier, the second contention of the appellant is that the police have no powers under the TNPID Act, to investigate an offence under the Act, without a sanction from the competent authority. In support of his contention, the appellant relies upon the fact that the same question of law is under consideration of the Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Crl.) No.53 of 2009, in an appeal arising out of a judgment of a learned Judge of this Court.


5. There are two aspects. The first is as to whether we are entitled to take note of the law laid down by a learned Judge of this Court in P.S.Chellamuthu v. State, at least as of persuasive value. The second aspect is as to whether the grant of a stay by the Supreme Court in P.S.Chellamuthu v. State, would act as a bar for us even to consider this contention.

6. According to the appellant, we are not entitled to take note of the law laid down by the learned Judge of this Court in P.S.Chellamuthu, in view of the stay granted by the Supreme Court. We are afraid that it is a wrong understanding of the law on the part of the appellant. In P.S.Chellamuthu,the question that arose before a learned Judge of this Court was as to whether the police have power to investigate into a complaint under TNPID Act or not. The learned Judge of this Court answered the question in the affirmative. On an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court granted leave and passed the following order:

"During the pendency of the appeal, operation and implementation of the impugned judgment and order shall as also further proceedings in C.C.No.31 of 2001 pending before the Special Court (TNPID Act) Chennai shall remain stayed".

7. The above order of the Supreme Court cannot be read as a blanket order of stay of all investigations by the police and all trials by the Special Courts in all cases throughout Tamil Nadu. If it is so construed, it would mean that after upholding the Constitutional validity of the Act, the Supreme Court had indirectly stayed the implementation of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the stay granted by the Supreme Court cannot be taken to be a general amnesty to all financial establishments from being prosecuted by the police under the TNPID Act.

8. The learned Judge was right in holding, on the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Shree Chamundi Moped Limited v. Church of South India Trust Association [1992 (3) SCC 1], that the grant of a stay by the Supreme Court in a case would not tantamount to wiping out the law laid down by the High Court. The law cannot be allowed to be in a state of limbo or presumed to be what the parties argue, until the Supreme Court finally decides the issue. At the most, the grant of an order of stay by the Supreme Court could be taken to mean that the issue raised
therein had not reached finality. What the appellant now wants us to do is to accept what according to him is the law, till the Supreme Court disposes of SLP (Crl.) No.53 of 2009.

9. We are afraid we cannot do that. We cannot ask thousands of depositors to await the outcome of the case pending before the Supreme Court from the year 2009, as many of them are senior citizens, who want their hard earned money to be repaid to them,before the last and final boarding call is made to them. Even if tell the depositors to wait till a decision is rendered by the Supreme court in the criminal appeal in P.S.Chellamuthu Vs. State, many of them may not be able to wait, as time waits for none.

10. As a matter of fact, the Company Court (of this Court) ordered notice in C.A.No.561 of 2015 in C.P.Nos. 143 to 145 of 2015 filed by the appellant for accepting a schedule of payment to the depositors. In response to the notice published by the appellant in newspapers, inviting objections to the proposed scheme of arrangement, hundreds of depositors have sent letters, partly written in ink and mostly in tears.

11.  The second contention of the appellant in entirety, loses sight of one more important fact. The FIR registered in Cr.No.05 of 2015 against the appellant and its Directors, is not merely for an offence under Section 5 of the TNPID Act, but also for the offence under Section 420 IPC. We are completely at a loss to understand as to why the Economic Offences Wing cannot even investigate into the offence under Section 420 IPC, for alleviating the sufferings of thousands of depositors, some of whom are at the fag end of their lives. Therefore, the second contention is also devoid of merits.

12. In the result, we find that the order of the learned Judge refusing to interfere with an investigation into a Criminal Complaint, does not call for any interference. Any interference with the investigation even at the stage of FIR, would completely jeopardise the interests of more than 6500 depositors to whom a sum of about Rs. 55 crores is due. It would also jeopardise the interests of 5 different Banks, to whom, a staggering amount of about Rs.189 crores is due from the appellant. Hence, the writ appeal is dismissed

Next Liquidation order and what should be your next course of action will be put up for social welfare.

It is my personal short note from order, It is not for coading in any court of law. It is put up in short form for easy understanding for interested peoples.

Thanks & Regards
Dr. Zulfiqar Ali Khan, M.A., M.L.,M.Phil(Law),Ph.D
Advocate & Commissioner of Oaths
No. 462,  Addl law Chambers
High Court of Madras
Chennai- 600 104
MB: 9884102961 / 9444412961

Helios & Matheson Information Technology Ltd, short Note on WP order

WP No. 14664 / 2015 & WP No. 14229 /2015
It is a combine order in two writ petition against two companies.

SHORT NOTE:

1.  W.P.No.14664 of 2015 has been filed by M/s Helios and Matheson Information Technology Ltd. [hereinafter would be referred to as Helios] for quashing the FIR in Cr.No.5 of 2015 that was registered on 01.04.2015 against the petitioner for an offence under Section 420 IPC and Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997 [hereinafter would be referred to as TNPID Act].

2. W.P.No.14229 of 2015 has been filed by Viswapriya (India) Limited, formerly known as Viswapriya Financial Services and Securities Ltd., [hereinafter would be referred to as Viswapriya] for quashing the FIR in Cr.No.5 of 2013 that was registered on 21.10.2013 by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Economic Offences Wing, for offences under Sections 120B, 406, 420 IPC and Section 5 of the TNPID Act.

3. It is indeed a sheer coincidence that, though Helios and Viswapriya have no relationship with each other, yet, they share a common Cr.No.5, but of course registered in different years. It is the specific case of the prosecution that, Helios and Viswapriya had collected deposits from public and on maturity, they failed to repay them, pursuant to which, on the complaint lodged by depositors, the aforesaid cases were registered against them for the offence under the TNPID Act along with IPC offences. At the outset, it is contended on behalf of Helios and Viswapriya that, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Economic Offences Wing has no authority to conduct investigation under the TNPID Act and therefore, the very FIR deserves to be quashed.

 4.  Steps taken under Criminal law for bringing the offender to book is an action in personam and steps taken to appropriate the properties of an offender is an action in rem. Section 5 of the TNPID Act describes the "offence" and the "punishment". Section 3 of TNPID Act provides for a procedure, similar to the one provided under Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 for attaching the properties of a financial institution that had defaulted in repaying the depositors. A Competent Authority is appointed by the Government for safeguarding the financial interests of the depositors. If the argument of the learned counsel for the accused is accepted, in a given case, if a financial establishment does not have any assets for the Government to proceed under Sections 3 and 4, the result will be that, the offender will have to be left scot-free. This will defeat the very purpose of the TNPID Act. Section 6(3) of the Rule merely casts a duty on the Police to assist the Competent Authority for the purpose of identifying the properties stashed by the offender. To say that, only the Competent Authority will have power to conduct investigation and prosecute the offender, would mean conferring police powers on a Revenue Official for which there is no provision either in the Act or in the Code. Section 5 of TNPID Act creates an offence made punishable upto 10 years. TNPID Act will fall within Classification II of the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the offence under Section 5 will be cognizable and non bailable, thereby empowering the Police by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to take up the investigation and register FIR under Section 154 of the Code. Hence, this contention is rejected.

5. In response to this submission, it is contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that, Cr.No.2 of 2015 and Cr.No.5 of 2015 are in respect of two different transactions on complaints given by two different persons in respect of deposits made by them separately with Helios and therefore,

"The complaint in Crime no.5 of 2015 was received on 01.04.2015. During enquiry in Crime No.2 of 2015, it came to the knowledge of the Investigating Agency that the amount involved in Crime No.2 of 2015 being a sum of Rs.2,19,020, a relatively smaller sum when compared to the present crime no.5 of 2015, was settled to the de facto complainant therein. The course, when amounts involved are settled subsequent to initiation of prosecution, is the area reserved by the TNPID Act for action by the competent authority in consultation with the special court. Since, Crime No.2 of 2015 was not taken charge of by the competent authority as on that date and the status of the said crime no was uncertain and since the deposits and dates of default in the two FIRs were separated by time, on receipt of complaints regarding defaults running to several crores of rupees involving more than 6500 depositors, the investigation agency has registered a separate FIR in Crime No.5 of 2015 on 01.04.2015. Hence, it is submitted that the registration of FIR in Crime No.5 of 2015 is justified and valid in law."

6. The sum and substance of his submission is that, Cr.No.2 of 2015 was registered and Helios settled with the complainant and the case could not be closed because the Competent Authority was not appointed to compound the case. Subsequently, when hundreds of complaints started pouring in, the police registered a fresh FIR based on a complaint given by one Dr.Ranjith Chittoori in Cr.No.5 of 2015 and arrested the accused. This explanation appears more plausible and acceptable to sustain the FIR in Cr.No.5 of 2015. As observed by the Supreme Court in T.T.Antony's case, "the objection is merely one of a form and not of substance and it makes no difference so far as the Final Report is concerned." Therefore, this Court directs the respondent police not to register any fresh FIR and treat all further complaints as 161 Cr.P.C. statements and proceed with the investigation of the case.

7. In the result, the petitions are dismissed. Anything observed on the facts of the case is confined to the decision in these writ petitions and it is always open to the parties to agitate factual questions before the appropriate forum. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.

It is my personal short notes from the order copy for easy understanding in short.

Thanks & Regards
Dr. Zulfiqar Ali Khan, M.A., M.L.,M.Phil(Law),Ph.D
Advocate & Commissioner of Oaths
No. 462,  Addl law Chambers
High Court of Madras
Chennai- 600 104
MB: 9884102961 / 9444412961